Progressivity, inequality reduction and merging-proofness are three well-known axioms in taxation. We investigate implications of each of the three axioms through characterizations of several families of taxation rules and their logical relations. We also study the preservation of these axioms under two operators on taxation rules, the so-called convexity operator and minimal-burden operator, which give intuitive procedures of determining a tax schedules.
Introduction
In modern welfare states, income tax is a major source of state funds and is an essential policy measure for the enhancement of distributive justice. In the framework introduced by O'Neill (1982), Aumann and Maschler (1985) and Young (1988) , 1 we study two principles of distributive justice, known as progressivity (tax rates are in the order of income) and inequality reduction (taxation reduces income inequality). We investigate how the two principles are related to each other and to another principle that prevents any gain from strategic merging among taxpayers. This third principle, called merging-proofness, is studied by de Frutos (1999) and Ju (2003) . We also study the robustness of the three principles, or axioms, of taxation under the application of two operators, known as convexity operator and minimal-burden operator (to be explained later).
income profile y ∈ R N + , and a tax revenue T ∈ R + such that ∑ i∈N y i ≥ T . Let Y ≡ ∑ i∈N y i . To avoid unnecessary complication, we assume Y = ∑ i∈N y i > 0. Let D N be the set of taxation problems with population N and D ≡ ∪ N∈N D N .
Given a problem (N, y, T ) ∈ D, a tax profile is a vector x ∈ R N satisfying the following two conditions: (i) for each i ∈ N, 0 ≤ x i ≤ y i and (ii) ∑ i∈N x i = T . We refer to (i) as boundedness and (ii) as balancedness. 2 We now provide some examples of rules. We start with three well-known rules. The head tax distributes the tax burden equally, provided no agent ends up paying more than her income. The leveling tax equalizes post-tax income across agents, provided no agent is subsidized. The flat tax equalizes tax rates across agents. These three rules are examples of rules in the following family introduced by Young (1987) .
Definition 1 (Parametric Rules). A rule R is a parametric rule if there is a function f :
[a, b] × R + → R, where a, b ∈ R ∪ {±∞}, such that (i) f is continuous and non-decreasing in the first variable; (ii) for each x ∈ R + , f (a, x) = 0 and f (b, x) = x; (iii) for each (N, y, T ) ∈ D and each i ∈ N, R i (N, y, T ) = f (λ , y i ), where λ ∈ [a, b] satisfies ∑ i∈N f (λ , y i ) = T . 3 We call f a parametric representation of R.
The three rules mentioned earlier have the following parametric representations:
• Head tax: f H (λ , y) = min{− 1 λ , y}, for each λ ∈ R − and each y ∈ R + .
• Leveling tax: f L (λ , y) = max{y − 1 λ , 0}, for each λ ∈ R + and each y ∈ R + .
• Flat tax: f F (λ , y) = λ · y, for each λ ∈ [0, 1] and each y ∈ R + .
Axioms
We now define our three main axioms of taxation.
Progressivity postulates that for any pair of agents, the one with higher income should pay at least as high a rate of tax as the other. Our second axiom requires that the post-tax income profile should have at least as low "income inequality" as the original income profile. This axiom is based on the following basic inequality relation over income profiles. For each population N ≡ {1, . . . , n} and each pair of income profiles y, y ∈ R N + , y Lorenz dominates y if, for each k = 1, . . . , n − 1, the proportion of the sum of the k lowest incomes to the total income at y is greater than or equal to the same proportion at y : that is, when y 1 ≤ y 2 ≤ ... ≤ y n and y 1 
Inequality reduction. For each (N, y, T ) ∈ D, the post-tax income profile S R (N, y, T ) Lorenz dominates y.
Our third axiom prevents a rule from being manipulated by a pair of agents through merging their incomes.
Merging-proofness.
For each (N, y, T ) ∈ D and each pair i, j ∈ N with i = j, if y ∈ R N\{ j} + is such that y i = y i + y j and y N\{i} = y N\{i, j} ,
We will investigate logical relations between the three axioms, invoking in the process some of the following standard axioms. 4 The next axiom requires that a rule should give the same tax profile when it is applied for any subset of agents as when it is applied for the whole population.
Consistency. For each
The next two axioms require that tax contributions and post-tax incomes be in the order of pre-tax income (Aumann and Maschler 1985) .
Tax order preservation. For each (N, y, T ) ∈ D and each pair
i, j ∈ N, if y i ≥ y j , R i (N, y, T ) ≥ R j (N, y, T ).
Income order preservation. For each (N, y, T ) ∈ D and each pair
Note that progressivity implies tax order preservation. Finally, the next axiom says that small changes in incomes or revenue do not produce a jump in tax schedules. 4 We refer readers to Thomson (2003 Thomson ( , 2005 ) for a detailed discussion on these axioms.
Continuity. For each
N ∈ N , each sequence {(N, y n , T n ) : n ∈ N} in D N , and each (N, y, T ) ∈ D N , if (y n , T n ) converges to (y, T ), then R (N, y n , T n ) converges to R (N, y, T ).
Characterizations and logical relation among axioms

Progressivity and merging-proofness
Lemma 1 gives a necessary and sufficient condition for a parametric rule to satisfy progressivity.
Lemma 1. A parametric rule satisfies progressivity if and only if it has a parametric representation that is superhomogeneous in income.
Proof. Let R be a parametric rule and f :
Conversely, assume that f is superhomogeneous in income. Let (N, y, T ) ∈ D and i, j ∈ N be such that 0
which shows the progressivity of R.
It is evident that progressivity implies the following axiom, which says that any two agents with the same income should pay the same tax. 6 The main difference between their model and ours is that our rules are multivariate vector valued functions with the two constraints of (income) boundedness or balancedness. Despite the differences, Proposition 1 shows that, thanks to Young's (1987) characterization of parametric rules, the earlier results can be extended in our model without much difficulty.
Lemma 2 gives a necessary and sufficient condition for a parametric rule to satisfy merging-proofness. 9 Now, due to Propositions 1 and 2, the logical relation between progressivity and mergingproofness can be established from the following relation between superhomogeneity and superadditivity.
Lemma 4. Superhomogeneity in income implies superadditivity in income.
Proof. Let y 0 and y 0 be such that 0
It follows from Propositions 1 and 2 and Lemma 4 that:
Corollary 1. Let R be a rule satisfying consistency and continuity. If R is progressive, then R is merging-proof. But the converse does not hold. 10
Remark 2. Without consistency and continuity, the logical relation between progressivity and merging-proofness in Corollary 1 does not hold, as shown by Example 1 in Section 5.
Remark 3.
Since rules take only non-negative values, if a parametric representation is superadditive in income (or superhomogeneous, by Lemma 4), then it is non-decreasing in income. Thus the corresponding parametric rule satisfies tax order preservation. Therefore, among parametric rules, merging-proofness (or progressivity) implies tax order preservation.
Note that any convex function that crosses the origin is superhomogeneous. This, together with Proposition 1 and Corollary 1, gives the following:
Corollary 2. Any rule with a parametric representation that is convex in income is progressive and merging-proof.
Both the leveling tax and the flat tax have parametric representations that are convex in income. Thus, they are both progressive and merging-proof. The same argument applies to show that two other classical tax rules, such as the proposals by Cohen-Stuart and Cassel (and formulated as rules by Young, 1988) , are progressive and merging-proof.
Progressivity and inequality reduction
We now investigate the logical relation between progressivity and inequality reduction. The following additional axioms are also considered.
Revenue continuity. For each N ∈ N , each y ∈ R N + , each sequence {T n : n ∈ N} in R + and each T ∈ R + , if T n converges to T , then R (N, y, T n ) converges to R (N, y, T ).
Revenue monotonicity. For each (N, y, T ) ∈ D and each T ≥ T , R (N, y, T ) R (N, y, T ).
Young (1987) offers the following useful lemma:
Lemma 5 (Young 1987) . Equal treatment of equals, revenue continuity, and consistency together imply revenue monotonicity. Now we are ready to prove the following result.
Proposition 3. The following statements hold: (i) Progressivity and income order preservation together imply inequality reduction. (ii) Inequality reduction and consistency together imply progressivity. (iii) Inequality reduction, together with consistency and revenue continuity (or revenue monotonicity), implies income order preservation.
Proof. The proof of parts (i) and (ii) will be provided in the appendix. Here we prove part (iii). Let R be a rule satisfying consistency, revenue continuity and inequality reduction (the same argument applies when revenue continuity is replaced with revenue monotonicity). Then by the second statement, R satisfies progressivity and also equal treatment of equals. By Lemma 5, R also satisfies revenue monotonicity. Suppose, by contradiction, that R violates income order preservation. Then, there exist (N, y, T ) ∈ D and i, j ∈ N such that y i < y j and
Consider the problem
Thus, by inequality reduction,
The next result follows directly from Proposition 3.
Corollary 3. For consistent and revenue continuous (or revenue monotonic) rules, the combination of progressivity and income order preservation is equivalent to inequality reduction.
Remark 4.
A similar result is established for tax functions by Eichhorn et al. (1984) . In order to extend that result in our model, we need the two additional axioms, consistency and revenue continuity (or revenue monotonicity).
It follows from Proposition 3 that since the leveling tax and the flat tax satisfy both progressivity and income order preservation, they satisfy inequality reduction. After strengthening revenue continuity to (full) continuity, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 4. A rule satisfies inequality reduction, consistency and continuity if and only if it has a parametric representation f : [a, b] × R + → R such that f is superhomogeneous in income and for each
Proof. Let R be a rule satisfying inequality reduction, consistency, and continuity. By Proposition 3, R satisfies progressivity and income order preservation. Then, by Proposition 1, R has a parametric representation f :
for all x ∈ R + . Suppose, by contradiction, that there exist x, y ∈ R + such that x < y and
contradicting income order preservation.
Conversely, let R be a rule with parametric representation f :
is nondecreasing. By Proposition 1, R satisfies progressivity, continuity and consistency. Then by Proposition 3, we only have to show income order preservation. Suppose, by contradiction, that there exist (N, y, T ) ∈ D and i, j ∈ N such that y i < y j and
contradicting the non-decreasing property of g λ (·).
Operators: what axioms are preserved?
An operator is a function that maps a rule into another, possibly the same, rule. An axiom is said to be preserved under an operator if any rule that satisfies the axiom is mapped by the operator into a rule that also satisfies the axiom. We consider two operators introduced by Thomson and Yeh (2001) and study preservation of our three main axioms.
Convexity operators
When two rules compete, a natural compromise is to mix the two rules by a convex combination as suggested by convexity operators. Formally, given a "reference rule"R (·) and a weight α ∈ [0, 1], the convexity operator associated withR and α maps each rule R (·) into the convex combination (1 − α) R (·) + αR (·). 12 The idea of mixing two rules is also useful for a smooth transition from one rule to another when such a transition is required.
Mixing two rules may lose its appeal if such an operation does not preserve some basic axioms of taxation. Fortunately, all of our three main axioms are preserved:
Proposition 5. Consider convexity operators associated with a reference ruleR (·). IfR (·)
satisfies progressivity, then each of these convexity operators preserves progressivity. And the same results hold for inequality reduction and merging-proofness.
Proof. We skip the proof of preservations of progressivity and merging-proofness, which is straightforward. Suppose that R (·) andR (·) satisfy inequality reduction. (N, y, T ) . Without loss of generality, assume that N ≡ {1, . . . , n} and that y 1 ≤ y 2 ≤ · · · ≤ y n . Letσ , σ and π : N → N be permutations on N such that for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, ( j) because, by definition ofσ , the righthand side is the sum of the i lowest post-tax incomes associated with the tax profilex. Similarly,
By inequality reduction of R (·) andR (·),
showing inequality reduction of R. 
Minimal-burden operator
T ) ≡ m(N, y, T ) + R(N, y − m(N, y, T ), T − M(N, y, T )).
The next proposition shows what axioms are preserved under the minimal-burden operator.
Proposition 6. The minimal burden operator preserves progressivity and inequality reduction. However, it does not preserve merging-proofness.
The proof is provided in the appendix. Example 1 below shows that the minimal-burden operator does not preserve mergingproofness. For rules satisfying the following very mild axiom, we show that the minimal-burden operator preserves merging-proofness.
Suppose that an agent donates part of his income and that the donation is used to finance tax revenue. Then both the donor's income and the tax revenue go down by the amount of the donation. The next axiom says that the donor's total payment (tax plus donation) should not be lower than his total payment without donation.
No Donation Paradox. For all (N, y, T ) ∈ D, all i ∈ N and all t ∈ [0, min{T, y i }],
R i (N, y, T ) ≤ t + R i (N, (y i − t, y −i ) , T − t)
. 13 Ju and Moreno-Ternero (2005) characterize a large family of rules satisfying no donation paradox and some other axioms. The family includes most of the well-known parametric rules, which shows no donation paradox is a very mild condition.
Note that the rule in Example 1 violates no donation paradox. To show this, consider the problem (N, y, T ) = ({1, 2}, (3, 15), 11) . Then, R (N, y, T ) = (0, 11) and R (N, (3, 13), 9) = (27/16, 117/16). Thus, R 2 (N, y, T ) = 11 > 2 + 117/16 = 2 + R 2 (N, (3, 13), 9 ).
Proposition 7. On the family of rules satisfying no donation paradox, the minimal-burden operator preserves merging-proofness.
The proof is provided in the appendix.
Concluding remarks
We conclude with some remarks associated with two other operators in Thomson and Yeh (2001) and the axioms that are dual to our main axioms.
Truncation and Duality Operators Truncation Operator maps each rule R (·) into R t (·) defined as follows: for each (N, y, T ) ∈ D and each
Progressivity is not preserved under truncation operator. To show this, we can use the flat tax (Thomson 2005 , Table 3 .2, p.205). Let us call the image of the flat tax under truncation operator truncated flat tax. It is easy to show that the truncated flat tax satisfies regressivity and differs from the flat tax. Thus it violates progressivity because the flat tax is the only rule satisfying both progressivity and regressivity.
Inequality reduction is not preserved under truncation operator. This is shown in Example 2.
Merging-proofness is not preserved under truncation operator. This is shown in Example 2. We can also use the flat tax and a similar argument to the above one provided for progressivity.
Example 2. Consider the leveling tax L.
It is easy to show that, in the two-agent case, L t (the image of L under the truncation operator) coincides with the so-called concedeand-divide (Thomson 2003) . This rule has the following expression, for the problems with
If T = 1 and (y 1 , y 2 ) = (1, 3), we have
which shows that concede-and-divide (and therefore L t ) violates progressivity. Similarly,
which shows that concede-and-divide (and therefore L t ) violates inequality reduction. Finally, consider the problem P ≡ ({1, 2, 3}, (1, 2, 3), 2) ∈ D and the resulting problem P ≡ ({1, 2}, (1, 5), 2) ∈ D in which agents 2 and 3 merge their incomes. Then, it is straightforward to show that L t (P) = (0, 1, 1) and L t (P ) = CD(P ) = (
, which shows that L t is not merging-proof.
Duality Operator maps each rule R (·) into R d (·) defined as follows: for each (N, y, T ) ∈ D and each
Progressivity is not preserved under duality operator. This is because regressivity is the dual property of progressivity and so for any progressive rule R (·) that differs from the flat tax, its dual R d (·) satisfies regressivity but not progressivity.
Inequality reduction is not preserved under duality operator. To show this, consider the leveling tax, of which the dual is the head tax. Note that the leveling tax satisfies progressivity and income order preservation. Thus by Proposition 3-(i), it also satisfies inequality reduction. On the other hand, the head tax satisfies regressivity and consistency. Thus by Proposition 3-(ii), it must violate inequality reduction.
Merging-proofness is not preserved under duality operator. This is because mergingproofness is the dual property of splitting-proofness and so for any merging-proof rule R (·) that differs from the flat tax, its dual R d (·) satisfies splitting-proofness. Since the flat tax is the only rule satisfying both merging-proofness and splitting-proofness, then R d (·) must violate merging-proofness.
(a) Income profiles
(b) Tax profiles 
Dual Axioms
As shown in Thomson (2005) , dual axioms of progressivity and merging-proofness are regressivity and splitting-proofness respectively. Proposition 3.9 in Thomson (2005) says that an axiom is preserved under truncation operator if and only if the dual axiom is preserved under minimal-burden operator. Therefore, from Proposition 6 we obtain: truncation operator preserves regressivity and the dual axiom of inequality reduction, but not splitting-proofness. Also from Proposition 7, we obtain: on the family of rules satisfying income monotonicity (which is the dual of no donation paradox), truncation operator preserves splitting-proofness.
A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3. Let (N, y, T ) ∈ D and i, j ∈ N be such that i = j and y i = y j . For simplicity, let i = 1 and j = 2 and N ≡ {1, . . . , n} (this problem is illustrated in the second row of Table 1 -(a)). Let x ≡ R(N, y, T ) and a ≡ y 1 = y 2 (x is illustrated in the second row of Table 1 -(b)). Let N ≡ N ∪ {n + 1, n + 2}. Consider the problem (N , (y, 0, 0) , T )(= (N , (a, a, y −{1,2} , 0, 0) , T )) where n + 1 and n + 2 have zero income and all agents in N have the same incomes as in (N, y, T ) (see the third row of Table 1 -(a)). By boundedness, R {n+1,n+2} (N , (y, 0, 0), T ) = (0, 0). By balancedness and consistency, R N (N , (y, 0, 0), T ) = R(N, y, T ) (see the third row of Table 1 -(b)). Now consider the problem (N \{1}, (a, y −{1,2} , a, 0) , T ) obtained by merging the incomes of agents 1 and n + 1 at (N , (y, 0, 0) , T ) into the income of agent n + 1 (see the fourth row of Table 1 -(a)). Let x ≡ R (N \{1}, (a, y −{1,2} , a, 0) , T ) (see the fourth row of Table 1 -(b)). Then x n+2 = 0 and by merging-proofness,
Consider the problem (N , (0, a, y −{1,2} , a, 0) , T ) where 1 and n + 2 have zero income and all others in N have the same incomes as in ({2, . . . , n + 1}, (a, y −{1,2} , a) , T ) (see the sixth row of Table 1 -(a)). Then, by boundedness and consistency, R (N , (0, a, y −{1,2} , a, 0) , T ) = (0, x 2 , x −{1,2} , x n+1 , 0). Now making the reverse argument but merging the incomes of 1 and n + 1 at (N , (0, a, y −{1,2} , a, 0) , T ) into 1's income and applying merging-proofness, we can show x 1 ≥ x n+1 , as x 1 = R 1 (N \{n + 1}, (a, a, y −{1,2} , 0) , T ).
Therefore, x 1 = x n+1 . By balancedness, x 2 + · · · + x n = x 2 + · · · + x n . Thus, the two reduced problems of (N, y, T ) and ({2, . . . , n + 1}, (a, y −{1,2} , a), T ) for the coalition {2, . . . , n} are identical. By consistency, (x 2 , . . . , x n ) = (x 2 , . . . , x n ).
To summarize, by replacing agent 1's income at (N, (a, a, y −{1,2} ), T ) with agent (n+1)'s income, we transformed the problem into ({2, . . . , n, n + 1}, (a, y −{1,2} , a), T ) and showed that 1's tax at the original problem is equal to (n + 1)'s tax in the new problem and the taxes of all others do not change. Now, transforming ({2, . . . , n, n+1}, (a, y −{1,2} , a), T ) into ({3, . . . , n, n+1, n+2}, (y −{1,2} , a, a), T ) and lettingx ≡ R ({3, . . . , n, n + 1, n + 2}, (y −{1,2} , a, a) , T ), we can show thatx {3,...,n+1} = x {3,...,n+1} = (x {3,...,n} , x n+1 ) = (x {3,...,n} , x 1 ) and x 2 =x n+2 . Therefore, x 1 =x n+1 and x 2 = x n+2 .
Applying the symmetric argument (the whole argument above) switching the role of n+1 and the role of n + 2, we can show that x 2 =x n+1 and x 1 =x n+2 . Therefore, x 1 = x 2 .
Proof of Proposition 3, parts (i) and (ii).
The proofs of parts (i) and (ii) below are similar to Eichhorn et al. (1984) .
(i) Let R be a rule satisfying progressivity and income order preservation. Let (N, y, T ) ∈ D. Assume, without loss of generality, that 0
Let k ∈ {1, ..., n − 1}. By (2),
By income order preservation, the post-tax income profile (y i − x i ) i∈N preserves the order of the pre-tax income profile y. Thus, (3) shows that the post-tax income profile Lorenz dominates the pre-tax income profile.
(ii) Let R be a rule satisfying inequality reduction. Suppose, by contradiction, that R is not progressive. Then, there exist (N, y, T ) ∈ D and i, j ∈ N, such that 0 < y i ≤ y j and
. Then, a i < a j , and therefore, 
Let i, j ∈ N be such that y i ≤ y j . There are three cases.
Case 3:
Now, since Y −T < y j and, by boundedness,
Therefore, combining (6) and (7),
Inequality Reduction: Let R be a rule satisfying inequality reduction. Let (N, y, T ) ∈ D, (N, y , T ), x m and x be given as in the above proof. Note that y − x m = y − x . By the inequality reduction of R at (N, y , T ), y − x Lorenz dominates y . Thus, we only have to show that y Lorenz dominates y. 14 It is clear that for each 14 Note that if y is increasingly ordered, so is y . which is true because the left-hand side is non-negative and the right-hand side is nonpositive. 15 To prove Proposition 7, we need the following additional axiom and lemma. No donation paradox and merging-proofness together imply the following useful property, as shown in the next lemma. Suppose that two agents i and j merge their income into j's income and agent j donates i's income. The property says that the total payment by the two agents should not be lowered by such a donation. 
Donation
By no donation paradox, applied to agent j with donation y i at N\{i}, y i + y j , y N\{i, j} , T , R j (N\{i}, y i + y j , y N\{i, j} , T ) ≤ y i + R j (N\{i}, y j , y N\{i, j} , T − y i ).
Combining the two inequalities, we obtain 
